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PROTECTING NONSHAREHOLDER
INTERESTS IN THE MARKET FOR
CORPORATE CONTROL: A ROLE
FOR STATE TAKEOVER STATUTES
Frank J. Garcia*
In the wake of the Supreme Court's controversial decision in
CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America,' which upheld Indi-
ana's takeover statute,2 the role of state legislatures in regulating
the market for corporate control3 has been a particularly acute
* Associate, Stoel Rives Boley Jones & Grey, Portland, Oregon. B.A., Reed College,
1985; J.D., University of Michigan Law School, 1989.
The author wishes to thank Professor Joseph Vining for his insight, encouragement
and support and to acknowledge his debt to Kimberly Helweg Garcia, his wife, for her
unflagging enthusiasm and interest in this project.
1. 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
2. The statute under review, Indiana's Control Share Acquisition Chapter, IND. CODE
ANN. § 23-1-42-1 to -11 (West 1989), is one of five basic types of statutes that states use
to regulate takeovers. See infra notes 114-18 and accompanying text.
3. The "market for corporate control," a term introduced by Henry Manne in his
seminal article, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. EcON. 110, 112
(1965), is commonly used to refer to the widespread purchase and sale of controlling
blocks of common stock through the mechanism of the tender offer. A tender offer "is a
public offer made by the [acquiring] firm to the . . . shareholders of the target firm to
purchase a certain number, usually a controlling interest, of the target firm's voting
shares at a specific price." Jarrell & Bradley, The Economic Effects of Federal and State
Regulations of Cash Tender Offers, 23 J.L. ECON. 371, 371 n.1 (1980). The offer will
generally include a substantial premium over market price to tendering shareholders and
will be open for a limited time. Id. Manne's thesis is that these transactions, and related
transactions such as mergers and non-tender offer acquisitions, constitute a distinct pub-
lic market in "corporate control," here viewed as a valuable asset independent of other
aspects of the enterprise. Manne, supra, at 112. In Manne's view, the primary force be-
hind this market is the potential for gain inherent in the target company's assets, realiza-
ble through the substitution of more efficient management. Id. at 112-13. The discipli-
nary effect attributed to this market, although abrupt, is considered salutary. See, e.g.,
Coffee, Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: A Critical Assessment of the
Tender Offer's Role in Corporate Governance, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1145 (1984). Coffee
notes Judge Friendly's characterization of the takeover bid as "the sharpest blade for the
improvement of corporate management." Id. at 1159 n.30 (quoting Friendly, Make Haste
Slowly, in COMMENTARIES ON CORPORATE STRUCTURE AND GOVERNMENT 525, 532 (D.
Schwartz ed. 1979)).
This basic proposition, that corporate control is traded to realize potential firm value,
underlies the position of modern advocates of minimally regulated takeover activity. See,
e.g., Davis, Epilogue: The Role of the Hostile Takeover and the Role of the States, 1988
Wis. L. REV. 491, 503-04 (discussing the neoclassical position). Opponents of this position
accept Manne's basic position, but question whether this market does increase the firm's
value or society's welfare, and regardless of this, whether and to what degree the inter-
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area of concern. Despite widespread activity in state legisla-
tures,4 numerous judicial opinions,5 and considerable academic
commentary,6 no clear consensus has emerged regarding either
the social benefits of increased takeover activity or the legiti-
macy of state regulation.7 The debate has developed two stable
but fundamentally opposed camps: those in favor of a deregu-
lated (or minimally regulated) market for control,8 and those
who support substantial regulation toward a marked decrease in
takeover activity." The latter group itself is divided on the valid-
ity of a state role in regulating this market; some advocate such
a role,10 and others favor federal preemption."
ests of other participants in corporate enterprise are injured by this activity. See, e.g.,
Coffee, supra, at 1199-250; Grippo, In Defense of State Takeover Laws, 8 N. ILL. U.L.
REV. 273, 276-77 (1988); Lipton, Corporate Governance in the Age of Finance Corporat-
ism, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1987).
4. See infra note 74 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 114-18 and accom-
panying text.
5. See infra Part II.C.
6. For an exhaustive list of commentators, see Note, Stakeholder versus Stockholder:
The Director's Proper Constituency in a Contest for Corporate Control, 15 WM. MITCH-
ELL L. REV. 475, 475 n.1 (1984) (authored by Marc C. Luther). For a recent symposium
on issues in corporate governance, see Symposium: Issues in Corporate Governance, 22
U. MiCH. J.L. REF. 1 (1988).
7. Federal regulation of this market is accomplished primarily by the Williams Act,
15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1988), which added sections 13(d)-(e) and 14(d)-(f)
to the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-7811 (1988). The Williams
Act, which seeks to protect investors by requiring full disclosure by persons acquiring
corporate control, adopts an approach similar to the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§
77a-77aa (1988), and to the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. Its disclosure and pro-
cedural requirements are intended to offer investors the opportunity to make informed
decisions without altering the balance to favor either bidders or targets. For a critical
view of the Williams Act's success in this neutrality, see Jarrell & Bradley, supra note 3.
8. E.g., .Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Re-
sponding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981); Jarrell & Bradley, supra note
3; Macey, State Anti-Takeover Legislation and the National Economy, 1988 Wis. L.
REV. 467; Jensen, The Takeover Controversy: Analysis and Evidence in KNIGHTS, RAID-
ERS, AND TARGETS: THE IMPACT OF THE HOSTILE TAKEOVER 314 (1988). For a useful exposi-
tion and overview of this position from a sympathetic commentator, see Note, Fear of
the Hostile Takeover: Having Tamed and Reined the Beasts, State Regulations Would
Kill Them as Well, 14 J. CORP. L. 133 (1988) (authored by Bradley William Kragel).
9. E.g., Coffee, supra note 3, at 1250-96; Grippo, supra note 3, at 277; Lipton, supra
note 3.
10. E.g., Booth, The Promise of State Takeover Statutes, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1635
(1988); Coffee, Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85
MICH. L. REV. 1 (1986); Shipman, The Case for Reasonable State Regulation of Corpo-
rate Takeovers: Some Observations Concerning the Ohio Experience, 57 U. CIN. L. REv.
507 (1988).
11. Lipton, supra note 3; see also Davis, supra note 3, at 503. For the view that
federal preemption offers little solace to those concerned with latent state protectionism,
see Romano, The Future of Hostile Takeovers: Legislation and Public Opinion, 57 U.
CIN. L. REV. 457, 468-75 (1988).
Protecting Nonshareholder Interests
This Note advances three basic propositions in support of the
view that states should play a role in regulating takeover activ-
ity. First, the policy debate over the social benefit of an active
and relatively unregulated market for control has been mis-
characterized as a debate over statistics, when actually it is a
conflict over norms. Arguments in favor of takeover activity are
generally built on an agency theory of the firm that assumes the
sole operative duty of firm management is shareholder wealth
maximization.12 Rather than simply a debate over whether take-
overs maximize shareholder wealth, however, the disagreement
concerns the fundamental issue of corporate governance, the
choice of a norm for corporate decision making. 3 The corporate
norm should reflect the public's answer to the problem of bal-
ancing shareholder interests against the concerns of non-
shareholder participants in the firm, such as management, em-
ployees, creditors, suppliers and, perhaps, the local community.
The argument is really over whether the exclusive concern for
shareholder wealth maximization is, or should be, the corporate
norm, and if not, what norm better expresses the public's judg-
ment concerning the protection of all participants in corporate
activity.
Second, within this controversy over norms, sound public pol-
icy and the development of corporate law favor a norm that con-
siders nonshareholder constituencies of the corporation. The
current ambiguity surrounding the scope of the fiduciary duty of
a target board in a takeover context reflects continuing contro-
versy over the extent to which the board may consider the inter-
est of nonshareholders. Contrary to the view taken in much of
the current literature, statutes and case law recognize the
board's responsibility to consider the interests of
nonshareholders.
Third, the market for corporate control, while arguably profit-
able for target company shareholders, fails to protect adequately
the interests of other constituencies. Instead, the market for cor-
12. See, e.g., Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259
(1982) (stating that arguments for reform of corporate governance fail to understand the
economic theory underlying the corporate form, i.e., agency cost theory); Romano, The
Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L. REV. 111, 113 (1987) (noting that
state takeover statutes are troublesome because they are inconsistent with "the core goal
of corporation law-the maximization of equity share prices").
13. Webster's Dictionary defines "norm" as "a principle of right action binding upon
the members of a group and serving to guide, control or regulate proper and acceptable
behavior." WEBSTER's NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 806 (1987). In the present
context, the group referred to is the board of directors, and the behavior concerned is the
conduct of corporate activity.
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porate control actually offers incentives to shareholders to place
nonshareholder groups in jeopardy. As a result of this break-
down in corporate governance, states have a legitimate role to
play in protecting nonshareholder interests. The most plausible
way to protect those interests through state takeover law is the
business combination statute,'4 such as the Wisconsin statute 5
recently upheld by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit in Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal
Foods Corp.'6 Such laws restore to the board a voice in takeover
negotiations and provide it with an effective opportunity to
speak for nonshareholders.
Part I of this Note describes a phenomenon of modern corpo-
rate activity first identified over fifty years ago as the "separa-
tion of ownership and control." This separation gives rise to the
need for a governing corporate norm; recognizing the normative
aspect of this phenomenon has direct implications for the take-
over debate.
Part II analyzes the problem of a target board's fiduciary duty
as the modern version of the fundamental normative issue of
corporate law. It argues that the norm of shareholder wealth
maximization, assumed as the starting point by those most in
favor of an active and minimally regulated control market, is
compelling in its simplicity but misleading in its characteriza-
tion of the law. A view of fiduciary responsibility that includes
consideration for nonshareholder interest, while conceptually
more complex and practically more difficult, is more consistent
with both the development of the law and the realities of corpo-
rate dynamics.
Part III analyzes and critiques the hostile takeover for its ef-
fect on nonshareholder interests. Although the socioeconomic ef-
fects of takeovers are unclear, there appears to be a genuine
threat posed to nonshareholders in the form of a wealth transfer
to shareholders. This occurs through the uncompensated imposi-
tion of high, unbargained-for risk levels on middle management,
employees, creditors and local communities.
Finally, Part IV argues that the state can play a legitimate
role in regulating the market for control to safeguard non-
shareholder interests. By restoring the board of directors to a
negotiating role in takeovers, business combination statutes,
14. See infra notes 125-33 and accompanying text.
15. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 180.726 (West Supp. 1989).
16. 877 F.2d 496 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 367 (1989).
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such as those in Delaware," New York, 8 and Wisconsin,1 9 can
function as a means of protecting or compensating nonshare-
holders for the imposition of increased levels of risk.
I. THE SEPARATION OF OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL
In 1932 Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means produced the found-
ing study of the modern publicly held corporation, The Modern
Corporation and Private Property.20 In that study, they docu-
mented the development of the corporate form of enterprise or-
ganization, from publicly chartered special purpose organiza-
tions to small private businesses in which the shareholders were
active owners, and finally into large social institutions. In these
large companies, the wealth of a great number of individuals is
aggregated under the direct control of a few professional manag-
ers, whose shareholdings are generally insignificant.2' This cen-
tralization of wealth under the direction of a few individuals has
transformed the unified concept of property into a weak form of
nominal ownership and strong de facto control.22
This separation of ownership and control makes possible both
the success of the corporate form and its gravest abuses. Chief
among its advantages is that it enables tremendous resources to
be assembled and managed towards a unified set of goals.23 This
feat would be otherwise impossible because most small busi-
nesses would lack necessary capital and large enterprises would
become hopelessly mired in the competing claims of thousands
of "owners." Thus, the effective concentration of economic
power can be seen as the genius of the modern publicly held
corporation.
The dissolution of the concept of property into components of
control and beneficial ownership also creates a difficult problem.
Under the "old" system of property, an owner's conduct was
guided by his own interest, limited only by the law and the com-
petition of the marketplace.2 4 Under the modern system, how-
ever, the individual owner's initiative is replaced by the direc-
17. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (Supp. 1988).
18. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 912 (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1990).
19. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 180.726 (West Supp. 1989).
20. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
21. Id. at 3-6.
22. Id. at 7.
23. Id. at 46.
24. Id. at 2-3, 333-39.
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tion of a team of professional managers, who are not usually
owners in any significant sense."6 The immediate consequence of
this substitution is the potential for a conflict of interests be-
tween the components of control and beneficial ownership.
Therefore, the fundamental question posed by the separation
of ownership and control is: "For what purpose and to whose
benefit shall the corporation be governed?"26 The separation has
placed control in a position of responsibility over vast human
and material resources that, in the aggregate, have a significant
impact on the community. As a result, the challenge for corpo-
rate law is to develop a standard of conduct that establishes for
what purpose and to whom control shall be accountable. Only
once such a norm is developed can the law proceed to articulate
methods of ensuring accountability.
Commentators in favor of a deregulated market for control as-
sume the separation of ownership and control as a starting point
and proceed to analyze the relative positions of ownership and
control as an agency relationship between shareholders as prin-
cipals, and management as agents.27 The argument then leaps
forward to an analysis of management's faithfulness to the
shareholders' interests, which are assumed to be solely the max-
imization of their wealth. Shareholder wealth maximization
would seem a reasonable first choice for a standard of conduct,
because it transfers the traditional concept of property rights to
the now-passive owners. Under this view, management is strictly
a trustee for the security owner.
Such theories, however, ignore the fundamental uncertainty
about the nature and objectives of corporate activity that under-
lies the debate over takeover regulation.28 Berle and Means ac-
curately foresaw that the revolution in the concept of property
wrought by the separation of ownership and control would cre-
ate a situation in which neither ownership nor control can claim
exclusive discretionary authority.29 The essential consequence of
this separation is that because the nature of ownership has
changed, one should not simply presume the interest of the new
''owners" to be the sole reference point for guiding a complex,
powerful institution with a broad impact on society.
25. Id. at 84-118.
26. Id. at 9.
27. Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and
Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976); Coffee, supra note 3, at 1154-55.
28. Johnson & Millon, Missing the Point About State Takeover Statutes, 87 MICH.
L. REv. 846, 855 (1989).
29. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, supra note 20, at 356.
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Passive, widely dispersed shareholders, by limiting their liabil-
ity and foregoing a significant degree of control, have surren-
dered the right to have the corporation operated in their sole
interest. They have released the community from the obligation
to protect their interest to the full extent of the traditional
property doctrine.3 0 The security holder is now an "investor,"
rather than an "owner," losing all the normative connotations of
ownership. As an investor, she is certainly entitled to protection,
but not exclusively so. In fact, other parties make "investments"
in the corporate entity, such as management, employees, credi-
tors, and local communities.
. Through the mechanism of state law, the separation of owner-
ship and control creates an entirely new legal entity that in-
volves the interrelation of a wide diversity of interests: "owners"
who supply capital; workers who create; consumers who give
value; local communities that provide infrastructure; and man-
agers, who exercise authority. The concentration of economic
power, and the dilution of ownership that accompanies this di-
versity of interests, sharpens the issue of accountability for the
protection of these interests.31
The result is that the state, as representative of the commu-
nity, is in a position to demand that enterprise be conducted in
a manner that best serves the interests of the community as a
whole. s2 The state, through its corporation laws, should develop
a governing norm which will best serve these interests. As Berle
and Means noted, "[w]hen a convincing system of community
obligation is worked out and is generally accepted . . the pas-
sive property right of today must yield to the larger interests of
society."33
The argument in favor of takeover activity is generally empiri-
cal in form: If takeovers maximize shareholder returns, then
they are good; if state regulation or corporate defensive mea-
sures decrease shareholder wealth, then they are bad.3 4 Such em-
pirical protakeover arguments are, in fact, making a veiled nor-
mative claim that exclusive concern for shareholder wealth
maximization is the rule of conduct that the state has chosen (or
30. Id. at 355.
31. Id. at 356.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. For example, "[plerhaps a complete answer to the question of whether takeovers
benefit the natural economy is contained in the evidence of the gains realized by those
lucky shareholders whose firms are the subject of a tender offer." Macey, supra note 8, at
471 (emphasis added). In view of the discussion in the text, perhaps not.
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ought to choose) as best serving the public interest. Takeovers,
these advocates argue, are wealth-maximizing tools, and there-
fore serve the public good.
The empirical argument actually addresses an important, but
secondary, question. The primary issue for the takeover debate
is whether states have decreed, or ought to decree, through their
corporation laws that exclusive concern for shareholder wealth
maximization is the corporate norm that best advances the pub-
lic interest.3 5 Because this issue has not been clearly settled in
favor of shareholder wealth maximization, state efforts to regu-
late takeovers in order to protect the interests of nonsharehold-
ers should proceed.
II. THE CORPORATE NORM-FOR WHOM ARE MANAGERS
TRUSTEES?
The advent of "junk bond, bust-up takeovers,""a the defensive
responses to such takeovers, and the dangers posed to a variety
of constituents have focused debate again on the issue that di-
vided Professors Berle and Dodd 7 over fifty years ago: For
whom are corporate managers trustees? 38
35. In reviewing a target board's refusal to stimulate an auction for the company, the
court in TW Servs. Inc. Shareholders Litig., 1989 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,334, at
92,180 n.14 (Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 1989), mused: "Questions of this type call upon one to ask,
what is our model of corporate governance? . . . [Riesolution of these questions ...
seems inescapably to involve normative questions ...." Takeover advocates could ar-
gue that an exclusive concern for shareholder wealth maximization is the accepted norm
in corporate law, and reflects the judgment on behalf of the public that it is in society's
best interest to run its corporations solely for the profits of its shareholders. See, e.g.,
Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 13, 1970, § 6 (Magazine), at 32. One could then proceed to an empirical study of
the wealth effects of takeovers in a consistent manner. However, it is essential to note
that the terms of the debate have been transformed. Shareholder wealth maximization,
and consequently the deregulation of the market for control, is a normative choice gov-
erned by consideration of the public good, and not a fundamental aspect of the corporate
landscape. It must be argued as a normative choice, and it can be criticized as such.
36. "In such a takeover, junk bonds (non-investment grade securities with a high rate
of return) allow a raider to make a 100% cash offer for a target of almost any size. If
successful in obtaining a controlling interest, the raider merges the target into itself and
sells assets of the target to help finance the acquisition." Lipton, supra note 3, at 11.
37. Professors Berle and Dodd addressed this issue from differing viewpoints as early
as 1932 and had a continuing dialogue. See infra notes 41-48 and accompanying text.
38. Lipton, supra note 3, at 35 (noting the resurgence of this issue).
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A. Historical Background of the Corporate Norm
The early, leading case on the question of the corporate norm
is Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.,"9 a 1919 Michigan Supreme Court
case. In Dodge, the plaintiffs challenged Henry Ford's plan to
use retained earnings for such purposes as building a hospital
for employees, rather than distributing them as dividends to
shareholders. As a basic statement of the corporate norm, the
court stated: "[A] business corporation is organized and carried
on primarily for the profits of the stockholders.
4 0
In holding stockholder profit to be the primary, but not exclu-
sive goal, the court framed the task which was to confront judges
and corporate governance commentators in the ensuing decades.
The challenge was to articulate a model of corporate governance
that would preserve the primacy of shareholder interests while
ensuring the board's freedom, perhaps even duty, to consider
nonshareholder interests.
This attempt was made, in part, through a debate conducted
between Professors Berle and Dodd that spanned over twenty
years. Dodd argued that corporate managers could legitimately
serve as trustees for a wide variety of constituencies, including
shareholders, labor, and the general public."1 Such a view is diffi-
cult to justify on the theory of a business corporation as an ag-
gregate of shareholders, with management serving them as trust-
ees. Echoing Berle and Means' earlier work, however, Dodd
emphasized that the corporation was a distinct legal entity, dif-
fering from the aggregate of its individuals both in law and in
fact."2 Giving weight to the legal status of the corporation as an
independent entity gives rise to a concept of fiduciary duty run-
ning to the entity, rather than simply to the shareholders. Man-
agement's duty was "no longer . . . to take from labor for the
benefit of capital, nor to take from the public for the benefit of
both, but to administer wisely and fairly in the interest of all." '43
Berle's resistance to this expanded view of management's re-
sponsibilities was rooted in his concern over the potential for
39. 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668 (1919).
40. Id. at 507, 170 N.W. at 684 (emphasis added). The court proceeded to order a
dividend of $19 million dollars, but refused to enjoin Ford's planned expenditures. Id. at
487, 506-510, 170 N.W. at 677, 684-85.
41. Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145
(1932).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1155 (quoting from Address by Owen D. Young, Jan. 1929, quoted in J.
SEARS, THE NEW PLACE OF THE STOCKHOLDER 209 (1929)).
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management to turn any latitude towards its own ends."' The
potential for abuse required that management's fiduciary duty
be drawn narrowly around shareholder interests unless and until
a suitably precise alternative could be developed.45
In 1954, Berle conceded that "the argument has been settled
[at least for the time being] squarely in favor of Professor
Dodd's contention." '46 Case law recognized that a board of direc-
tors' fiduciary duty was not breached by consideration of re-
sponsibility to a wider community.4 7 Berle later noted that
"modern directors are not limited to running business enterprise
for maximum profit, but are in fact and recognized in law as
administrators of a community system."4 8
B. The Modern Context: The Corporate Norm Under
Scrutiny
The dramatic increase in takeover activity has called into
question this basic view of the corporate norm. Generally, advo-
cates of an active market for control make a fundamentally dif-
ferent assumption regarding the corporate manager's fiduciary
duty: that wealth maximization of shareholders is the sole legiti-
mate goal of management."9
From this view, hostile takeovers are the ultimate means of
maximizing shareholder wealth by reducing agency costs.5 ° Al-
ternatively, takeovers are defended as the attempt to exploit the
potential for synergistic gains, which are reflected in the share-
holders' premium.5 Either approach leads naturally to the con-
clusion that state takeover laws and legal rules allowing defen-
44. Berle, For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV.
1365, 1367 (1932).
45. Id.
46. A. BERLE, THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 169 (1954).
47. See, e.g., A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 13 N.J. 145, 98, A.2d 581, appeal dis-
missed, 346 U.S. 861 (1953).
48. Berle, Foreword to THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY at xii (E. Mason ed.
1959).
49. See, e.g., Macey, supra note 8, at 469 (arguing that statutes allowing the board of
directors to consider nonshareholder interests in developing a tender offer response "ab-
rogate the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty traditionally owed to shareholders"). For
additional examples of this view, see supra note 12.
50. See Fischel, supra note 12, at 1261-65.
51. Bradley, Desai & Kim, Synergistic Gains from Corporate Acquisitions and Their




sive tactics violate the fundamental corporate norm by
decreasing shareholder wealth.
52
Proponents of the shareholder wealth maximization view ar-
gue further that to include broader concerns within manage-
ment's fiduciary duty will lead to inefficiency by disturbing the
market mechanism, promoting arbitrary management decision
making, and distorting the allocation of resources. Target direc-
tors would be ill-suited to protect nonshareholders from any pu-
tative dangers from takeover activity, these proponents contend,
because "[t]hey lack political legitimacy and the capacity to bal-
ance goals of profit maximization with the concerns of nonshare-
holders."53 In any event, they argue, nonshareholder constituen-
cies can adequately protect themselves through negotiation,
contract and litigation."
4
The response to these protakeover arguments has been three-
fold. The first set of arguments challenges the substantive claims
made on behalf of the market for control by questioning the effi-
ciency of the market underlying share prices, the validity of the
disciplinary hypothesis, or the reality of synergistic gains.5 The
second approach recognizes that some takeovers may function as
claimed, but stresses that takeovers also create risks and losses
for shareholders and nonshareholders as well as for the economy
and American society as a whole. 6 These risks and losses are
considered legitimate concerns in the formulation of public
policy.
5 7
The third criticism is the most central attack on the protake-
over theorists. It asserts that to assume an exclusive concern for
shareholder wealth maximization as the corporate norm funda-
mentally mischaracterizes the nature of corporate responsibility
both in fact and in law. These critics argue that "the sharehold-
ers-only view ignores the reality that other constituencies share
the risk and are vital to the success of corporate activity."58 For
example, Professor Summers argues that employees are as much
members of the enterprise as the shareholders; 59 in fact, employ-
52. Romano, supra note 12, at 113.
53. Note, Takeover Dangers and Nonshareholders: Who Should Be Our Brothers'
Keeper?, 1988 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 301, 338 (authored by Christopher J. Smart); see also
Note, supra note 6.
54. Lipton, supra note 3, at 162.
55. Coffee, supra note 3, at 1163-67, 1207.
56. Id. at 1221-50.
57. Id.
58. Lipton, supra note 3, at 37.
59. See Summers, Codetermination in the United States: A Projection of Problems
and Potentials, 4 J. COMP. CoRP. L. & SEC. REG. 155 (1982).
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ees may have made a greater investment through years of ser-
vice, are less able to withdraw, and probably have a greater
stake in the future of the enterprise than the widely dispersed
shareholders.6 0 The same reasoning can be applied to other in-
terests, such as creditors, customers, suppliers, and local com-
munities, that play an integral role in the success of the corpo-
rate enterprise."1
Moreover, in the context of a takeover bid, the contracting
process may not protect these interests because it is a prospec-
tive attempt to establish the terms of a future relationship.2
Such a mechanism is less effective where parties cannot accu-
rately anticipate future contingencies. Shareholders who tender
their holdings may receive huge premiums for forcing a much
higher level of risk, both on the firm and on constituent groups,
than that for which the parties originally bargained. 3
C. The Current Legal Status of Nonshareholder Interests
The fiduciary responsibility of target management in the con-
text of a takeover bid is the "most unresolved doctrinal issue of
contemporary corporate law."6 4 Within this ambiguity, however,
courts have recognized that the scope of a board's fiduciary duty
to the corporation includes consideration of the interests of
nonshareholders.
The leading authority recognizing management's responsibil-
ity to consider nonshareholder interest is Unocal Corp. v. Mesa
Petroleum Co.,63 from the Supreme Court of Delaware, the lead-
ing corporate law jurisdiction. In Unocal, the court upheld a tar-
get's self tender that excluded the bidding firm. 6 In reviewing
the board's decision, the court noted that it was the responsibil-
ity of the directors to consider the effect of the bid on the corpo-
rate enterprise, including "the impact on 'constituencies' other
than shareholders (i.e., creditors, customers, employees, and per-
haps even the community generally). 6 7
60. Id. at 170.
61. Lipton, supra note 3, at 37-38.
62. Id. at 38-39.
63. Coffee, The Uncertain Case for Takeover Reform: An Essay on Stockholders,
Stakeholders and Bust-ups, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 435, 447-48.
64. Coffee, supra note 3, at 1216.
65. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
66. Id. at 958-59.
67. Id. at 955.
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Federal courts also have found it within management's pur-
view to consider interests beyond the shareholders. In Herald
Co. v. Seawell,68 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit upheld the Denver Post's defensive responses to a
takeover bid from a large newspaper chain. 9 In upholding the
legitimacy of the board's concern for other constituencies, the
court noted that "[s]uch a newspaper corporation, not unlike
some other corporations . . . has an obligation to those people
who make its daily publication possible."7 °
Similarly, a federal district court in the Southern District of
New York, another prominent corporate law jurisdiction, stated
clearly the propriety of management's concern for other constit-
uencies in the face of a takeover bid:
A corporation with a perceived threat of dismemberment
of large divisions of the enterprise, employing thousands
of employees, owes substantial regard for their pension
benefits, and in the case of loyal management, severance
benefits. These legitimate concerns for their past conduct
of the enterprise and its requirements need not be left to
the goodwill of an unfriendly acquirer of corporate con-
trol in the jungle warfare involving attempted takeovers.
The exercise of independent, honest business judgment
• ..is the traditional and appropriate way to deal fairly
and even-handedly with both the protection of investors,
on the one hand, and the legitimate concerns and inter-
ests of employees and management of a corporation who
service the interests of investors, on the other.7"
Recent decisions in the state and federal courts, however, have
underscored the ambiguity which plagues this area of the law.
For example, in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holding,
Inc.,72 the Delaware Supreme Court limited the target board's
freedom to consider noteholder's interests to noninterference
with contractual rights. Because this limitation applies only
when the breakup of the corporation is inevitable, it does not
squarely reverse Unocal, though it does call into question the
extent of protection nonshareholders' interests will receive.
7 3
68. 472 F.2d 1081 (10th Cir. 1972).
69. Id. at 1100.
70. Id. at 1095.
71. GAF Corp. v. Union Carbide Corp., 624 F. Supp. 1016, 1019-20 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
72. 506 A.2d 173, 182-83 (Del. 1986).
73. Lipton, supra note 3, at 41.
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Faced with such ambiguity in the case law, states have re-
sponded by amending their corporate codes to clarify the
board's authority to consider nonshareholder interests.7" For ex-
ample, Pennsylvania's law establishing the fiduciary duty of a
director was changed in 1986 to read:
In discharging the duties of their respective positions, the
board of directors . . . may, in considering the best inter-
ests of the corporation, consider the effects of any action
upon employees, upon suppliers and customers of the
corporation, and upon communities in which offices . ..
are located. . . .The consideration of those factors shall
not constitute a violation of fiduciary duty.7"
If there is any consensus in the law today on a corporate fidu-
ciary's responsibilities, it is reflected in the American Law Insti-
tute's Principles of Corporate Governance.76 Section 2.01, in set-
ting forth "the objective and conduct of the business
corporation," is basically a restatement of the corporate norm.
The corporation should conduct its activities "with a view to en-
hancing corporate profit and shareholder gain."'77 However,
"whether or not corporate profit and shareholder gain are
thereby enhanced," the corporation may also take into account
"ethical considerations that are reasonably regarded as appro-
priate to the responsible conduct of business. "
'
7
The phrase "with a view to" does not reflect the absolute
mandate for shareholder wealth maximization advocated by the
protakeover school. The additional language regarding ethical
considerations sets forth the legal right of a corporation and its
directors to pursue conduct that may not maximize shareholder
gain, provided it is appropriate to the responsible conduct of
business. While such language is not an outright endorsement of
the legitimacy of concern for nonshareholder interests, a strong
argument can be made that such concerns are indeed "appropri-
ate and should be extended to the takeover context.
'7 9
74. For example, Maine, Minnesota, Missouri, Ohio, and Pennsylvania now have such
statutes. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 716 (Supp. 1989); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
302A.251(5) (West Supp. 1990); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.347(1.)(4) (Vernon Supp. 1990);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(E) (Anderson Supp. 1989); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
1721(c) (Purdon Supp. 1990).
75. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8363(b) (Purdon Supp. 1989).
76. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 2.01 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1984). See Cof-
fee, supra note 3, at 1220 (noting consensus on this issue).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Coffee, supra note 10, at 84.
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The American Law Institute (ALI) analysis supports the con-
tention that management acts within its lawful responsibilities
when it considers the effects of a takeover on nonshareholder
groups. But to what extent this consideration can limit or dis-
place shareholder interest is difficult to fix precisely. The most
likely setting for courts to consider the issue is in a review of
defensive tactics under the business judgment rule.80 Although it
would be unwise for nonshareholder interests to trump share-
holder interests, disregarding the consideration of non-
shareholder interests entirely would contradict both legal au-
thority and the reality of corporate dynamics. It is more likely
that in close cases, management should be able to consider
threats to nonshareholder interests as justifying a course of con-
duct that yields roughly similar returns to shareholders as a
takeover bid.81 While inclusion of nonshareholder interests may
render a court's business judgment analysis more complex, the
ALI provides clear support for a board's concern for non-
shareholder constituencies in the context of a takeover attempt.
80. The business judgment rule is a presumption that after reasonable investigation,
disinterested directors have adopted a course of action that they honestly and reasonably
believe in good faith will benefit the company. Unless a plaintiff proves that the directors
have failed to do this in a material respect, a court will not step in and second-guess
their business judgment nor will it find the directors liable for damages arising from the
decision. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 871-73 (Del. 1985); Farrar, Busi-
ness Judgment and Defensive Tactics in Hostile Takeover Bids, 15 CAN. Bus. LJ. 15,
19-20 (1989).
Delaware courts have been active in attempting to work out the application of the
business judgment rule to directors' decisions to adopt defensive tactics. In a takeover
context, the burden shifts onto the directors, as defendants, to satisfy the court that they
had "reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness
existed," and that the defensive measures were "reasonable in relation to the threat
posed." Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985). This burden
is met by showing good faith and reasonable investigation. Id. Consideration of non-
shareholder interests could conceivably affect the determination both of whether there
were reasonable grounds to believe there was a "danger to corporate policy," and the
reasonableness of the actions taken in response to that threat.
81. For example, in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holding, Inc., 506 A.2d
173, 184 (Del. 1986), the court invalidated a lock-up with a third-party bidder, Forst-
mann Little & Co., on the grounds that the lock-up ended an active auction, although it
assured a price to shareholders of $57.25, higher than the then-current takeover bid of
$56.25 per share. If the court had recognized as legitimate the board's attempt, through
the lock-up, to protect bondholders by supporting failing note prices, it would have been
hard-pressed not to see the lock-up as, on the whole, a desirable transaction.
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III. TAKEOVER EFFECTS ON NONSHAREHOLDER INTERESTS
Empirical evidence seems overwhelmingly in favor of the view
that the takeover is a wealth maximizing event for the target
shareholders.8 ' Nevertheless, such evidence does not resolve con-
clusively the debate over takeover regulation for two reasons.
First, it can still be argued that shareholder premiums reflect, at
least in part, wealth transfers from nonshareholder groups such
as bondholders or employees.8" Second, as argued above,8 4 the
law recognizes the responsibility of target management to con-
sider the effects of takeovers on nonshareholders as well.
The effects of takeovers on nonshareholder groups can be
roughly split into two categories" the "socioeconomic" effects,
such as plant closings and lost jobs; and the "intrafirm" effects,
which subject the firm's constituencies to a higher-than-bar-
gained-for level of risk.
One commentator has written that "virtually every state can
demonstrate the 'bloody shirt' effects of the waves of hostile
takeovers."8 Such effects include plant closings, employee lay-
offs, firm liquidations, relocations, and the selling of assets.8
These events have resulted in severe and adverse consequences
to individuals, families, and communities dependent on the sta-
ble and continuous operation of local corporations.87
Arguments in favor of takeover regulation on these grounds
can be justly criticized. Much of the adverse impact on non-
shareholder groups may simply be the normal consequences of
the essential pursuit of economic efficiency, as nonproductive or
excess plants, resources, and personnel are eliminated. 88 Even if
many adverse consequences are economically necessary, how-
ever, this does not guarantee that they are always so. 9
82. See, e.g., Jensen, supra note 8.
83. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 3.
84. See supra Part II.C.
85. Schumann, Introduction, 8 N. ILL. U.L. REV. 197, 199 (1988) (Symposium on State
Corporate Anti-Takeover Legislation).
86. Id.
87. Grippo, supra note 3, at 277.
88. Macey argues further that the "available evidence" indicates that takeover bid-
ders don't fire all workers or unilaterally lower wages. Macey, supra note 8, at 478. Spin-
off transactions, the argument goes, generally preserve workers and seldom result in liq-
uidations. If they do, Macey concludes the national employment picture doesn't change,
since local workers lose, but out of state workers win. Id. at 478-79.
89. The case in favor of takeover activity as enhancing and creating social welfare,




Furthermore, the tremendous negative impact of takeovers
has created substantial local constituencies whose concerns and
grievances are legitimate objects of attention by state policy-
makers. Even assuming that takeovers maximize shareholder
wealth, legislators must still reckon with the cost to these other
groups that such maximization will entail. Such concern is par-
ticularly warranted, given the possibility that these losses to
nonshareholder groups may involve little or no increase in eco-
nomic efficiency2
With regard to intrafirm effects, the challenge has been to de-
velop a coherent set of answers to whether nonshareholder losses
exist, to what extent they are offset by shareholder gains, and to
what compensation, if any, the law should provide.2 Although
concentrated academic study of the intrafirm effects of take-
overs on nonshareholder groups has only recently begun," pre-
liminary analysis suggests that the structure of a takeover will
inevitably involve negative consequences within the firm on non-
shareholder interests. 4
From the perspective of nonshareholder groups, the market
for control is fundamentally flawed. Not only is it designed to
protect the shareholders, but it may even 'function as an incen-
tive for the shareholders to injure nonshareholder interests. Ac-
cording to the agency theory of the firm, management incentives
such as stock options and, ultimately, the discipline of the mar-
ket for control itself, are designed to align management interests
with shareholder interests, which are not equivalent with the in-
terests of nonshareholder groups. 5 The structure of a tender of-
fer encourages a potentially serious conflict of interest between
shareholders and nonshareholder groups.9 6
The central problem raised within the firm for nonsharehold-
ers by the prospect of a hostile takeover is the level of risk.9 7
Proponents of the agency theory of the firm see only the share-
holders as bearing the residual risk of the firm's production in-
90. Schumann, supra note 85, at 199-200.
91. Coffee, supra note 3, at 1249.
92. Davis, supra note 3, at 516; Johnson & Millon, supra note 28, at 854.
93. Davis, supra note 3, at 516.
94. Coffee, supra note 63, at 447.
95. Commentators on all sides of the debate recognize the folly in equating share-
holder and nonshareholder interests. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 10, at 104; Eisenberg,
The Legal Roles of Shareholders and Management in Modern Corporate Decision Mak-
ing, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 16 (1969); Fischel, supra note 12, at 1266-67 & n.24.
96. See Coffee, supra note 10, at 12.
97. Id. at 16-24.
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vestment decisions. 8 Therefore, only the shareholders are in
need of governance protection, with other interests protected by
the external market.9 Employees, suppliers, pensioners, and
lower level managers also have an economic interest in the firm,
however, and share in the residual risk. Local communities have
in many cases made significant firm-specific investments in de-
veloping the infrastructure to support local corporations. '00
These interests can be adversely affected by an increase in risk
borne by the firm. Thus, this increase in risk breaches the share-
holders' implicit contracts with the other stakeholders regarding
the expected levels of risk under which the stakeholders were to
perform their duties and invest their firm-specific capital.'0 1 In
effect, the takeover results in a breakdown of this contracting
process.
This breach occurs both before and after a takeover. Pretake-
over management has the incentive to accept riskier production
investment decisions on the chance that this will boost share
prices past the point of a takeover threat.0 2 One result of this
increase in risk is to transfer wealth from bondholders, who face
a decrease in the value of their investment when management
incurs additional risk that promises the bondholders no addi-
tional return.'0 3 Unlike creditors, who can price protect them-
selves ex ante for such risk, other nonshareholder interests lack
mechanisms for protection even though the security of their in-
vestment is placed in jeopardy by higher risk levels.'
98. Id. at 11-12.
99. Id.
100. Coffee, supra note 10, at 72.
101. One good account of this central problem of risk is Professor Coffee's "implicit
contracts" analysis. Coffee, supra note 63, at 446-48. On this view, one of the functions
of the corporation, when viewed as a nexus of contracts, is to support "implicit con-
tracts" reached between shareholders and nonshareholders who participate in or interact
with the corporation. Out of their long-term continuing relationships, the parties develop
certain expectations with regard to, for example, the length and security of their employ-
ment or supply relationship, the acceptable level of debt financing, or the duration of the
corporation's presence within the community. Davis, supra note 3, at 515-16; see also
Coffee, supra note 63, at 447-48 & n.44.
102. Coffee, supra note 10, at 61-63.
103. One response on behalf of noteholders is the use of "poison pill" bond provi-
sions, in which the corporation, in return for a lower initial interest rate, pledges to raise
the interest rate paid on outstanding bonds in the event of certain changes in control,
including takeovers. The use of such provisions is a response to "bondholder[s'] concerns
that have cropped up over the last year about having their bonds lose a great deal of
value in a takeover situation." See Weiss, U.S. Companies Reap Benefits from New
"Poison Pill" Bond Provisions, Portland Daily J. Com., June 18, 1990, at 12 col. 3 (quot-
ing Jeffrey M. Jackson, managing director of corporate finance for American Airlines).
104. Cf. Coffee, supra note 3, at 1248.
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When a takeover bid is made, the threat to nonshareholders
becomes acute. The shareholders are offered a lucrative incen-
tive to breach their implicit contracts with the stakeholders in
the pursuit of maximum shareholde gain. Employees and other
constituencies will face an increased risk to job security if the
takeover succeeds. While senior management can have recourse
to "golden parachutes, '1 0 5 it is unlikely that firms will have
shouldered the burden of higher wages or severance-related
compensation programs for middle management or the rank and
file. In addition to the threat of liquidation or retrenchment,
employees are endangered by the higher levels of debt incurred
in the acquisition and borne by the newly structured, highly
leveraged firm. If not fired outright;, middle management and
employees face continued employment under increased levels of
risk from a transaction to which they did not consent and from
which they received no compensation.'
States should be seen as the ultimate residual risk bearers, the
insurers for the losses that limited liability spares the sharehold-
ers. 107 A state may suffer increased welfare rolls and end up par-
tially funding tort-creditors if the corporation fails. Plant clos-
ings and layoffs can ultimately fall upon the state as welfare and
unemployment insurance payments. Local communities that
make firm-specific investments in infrastructure are likewise
vulnerable to the level of risk accepted by such firms.0 8
In summary, the hostile takeover, although apparently wealth-
maximizing for target shareholders, presents a serious threat of
wealth transfers from nonshareholding constituencies. One form
of transfer is the uncompensated increase in risk borne by credi-
tors, middle level management, employees and local communi-
ties. Far from protecting these groups, the structure of the take-
over gives shareholders a tremendous incentive to maximize
their wealth at the cost of breaching their implicit contracts with
these stakeholders. Viewed in this light, the premium that in-
duces the breach reflects, at least in part, funds that should in
some form be allocated to compensate other stakeholders. Be-
cause the implicit contracting process has broken down, how-
ever, noncontracting means are needed to protect these risk-
bearers.
105. "Golden poarachutes" are "severance contracts that compensate managers for
the loss of their jobs in the event of a change in control." Jensen, supra note 8, at 340.
106. See Coffee, supra note 10, at 72-73.
107. Id. at 72.
108. Id.
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IV. THE ROLE OF THE STATES IN PROTECTING
NONSHAREHOLDER INTERESTS
The development of the law of fiduciary duty and the under-
lying corporate norm suggest that it should be the board of di-
rectors' role to safeguard -nonshareholder interests. 10 9 It is a
unique feature of the hostile takeover, however, that it is
designed to sidestep the board, which is otherwise active in ma-
jor structural changes.110 The' ability of the board to carry out its
responsibilities to nonshareholders is thus singularly excluded.
Generally, the board remains involved only in the context of de-
fensive measures, such as adopting a shareholders' rights plan,
or "poison pill," ' or negotiating a leveraged buyout. These tac-
tics function either to deter a takeover altogether, or to stimu-
late an auction which maximizes the premium to shareholders.
Neither effect will function to protect nonshareholder interests
should a takeover occur.
The gap in legal protection of nonshareholder interests cre-
ated by the structure of a hostile takeover justifies state inter-
vention. Some state legislation has clearly been aimed at pro-
tecting nonshareholder interests,1 2  but the bulk of such
109. Some commentators have suggested that nonshareholder constituencies should
be given board representation. See, e.g., Conard, The Supervision of Corporate Manage-
ment: A Comparison of Development in European Community and United States Law,
82 MICH. L. REV. 1459 (1984); Williamson, Corporate Governance, 93 YALE L.J. 1197
(1984); Note, Employee Codetermination: Origins in Germany, Present Practice in Eu-
rope, and Applicability to the United States, 14 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 947 (1977) (authored
by J. Bautz Bonanno).
However, members of these constituencies may not have any business skill regarding
structural change issues simply by virtue of their role as employee or creditor. Eisenberg,
supra note 95, at 18-19. In addition, there is the risk that board meetings could degener-
ate into stalemates between representatives of opposing interests. Id. Finally, such repre-
sentation would seem unnecessary, given the fact that the law recognizes the responsibil-
ity of the board, as presently constituted, to take cognizance of these concerns.
110. Advocates of the efficacy of the takeover consider this aspect a prime virtue.
See, e.g., Note, supra note 53, at 313-30. Even granting this, it is nevertheless a struc-
tural problem that such a mechanism for removing entrenched management creates the
risk that not all voices within the corporation will be heard in a takeover context.
111. When triggered by a hostile tender offer, the "flip-in" provision of a second-
generation shareholders' rights plan, or poison pill, effects an abrupt and extreme dilu-
tion of the target's equity, unless the preferred stock issued under the plan is redeemed
by the target board. See, e.g., Grand Metro., PLC v. Pillsbury Co., 558 A.2d 1049, 1051
n.2 (Del. Ch. 1988) (discussing a poison pill provision). It is this extreme dilution of
equity which would make the pill so hard for an interested bidder to "swallow."
112. Coffee, supra note 10, at 93 (citing provisions which clarify the scope of a
board's fiduciary duty to include nonshareholder interests and business combination
statutes such as Wisconsin's recent law).
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legislation has been ostensibly designed to safeguard
shareholders. 1 3
There are currently five basic types of state takeover statutes:
disclosure laws, designed to give shareholders information rele-
vant to their decision to tender;"' fair price laws, which regulate
the second step of two-step transactions; 1 5 business combina-
tion statutes, which prohibit certain transactions for a period of
years after a takeover that was not approved by the board ex
ante;" appraisal laws, which guarantee nontendering sharehold-
ers a judicially determined "fair value";" 7 and control share ac-
quisition statutes, which prevent an acquirer from exercising the
voting rights of its shares without a separate majority vote by
the remaining shareholders.''"
113. The controversial history of state legislative efforts in this area began on March
3, 1968, when Virginia enacted the first state takeover statute. 1968 Va. Acts ch.119 (re-
pealed 1989). Thirty-seven states proceeded to adopt so-called "first-generation" statutes
until the Supreme Court's 1982 decision in Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982),
which struck down the Illinois Business Take-Over Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121/, para.
137.51-.70 (repealed 1983). Booth, supra note 10, at 1638 n.8.
Following MITE, twenty-two states adopted some form of "second- generation" stat-
ute, attempting in part to avoid the commerce clause problems that undermined the
Illinois statute. Booth, supra note 10, at 1637 n.8. These efforts reached a turning point
in 1987 when the Supreme Court upheld Indiana's Control Share Acquisition Chapter,
IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-1 to -11 (West 1989), in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am.,
481 U.S. 69 (1987).
The Court's unexpected ruling in CTS ushered in the "third-generation" of state take-
over legislation. The current arsenal of state takeover measures includes a mixture of
second- and third-generation laws. See infra notes 114-18 and accompanying text. As of
mid-1988, twenty-nine states had enacted one or more such statutes, including twelve
since the April 1987 CTS decision. Schumann, supra note 85, at 200.
114. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 80B.01-.13 (West 1986 & Supp. 1990); N.Y. Bus.
CORP. LAW §§ 1601-13 (McKinney 1986).
115. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-374a to -374c (West 1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
607.108 (West Supp. 1988); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 14-2-232 to -235 (Supp. 1987); ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 32, para. 7.85 (1987); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 271B.12-200 to -220 (Michie/
Bobbs-Merrill 1989); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12:131-134 (West 1969 & Supp. 1990); MD.
CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. §§ 3-601 to -603 (1985 & Supp. 1989); MIcH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. §§ 450.1776-.1784 (West Supp. 1989); MIsS. CODE ANN. §§ 79-25-1 to -7 (1989); N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 55-75 to -79 (Supp. 1989); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1409.1 (Purdon Supp.
1989); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-725 to -728 (1985,& Supp. 1988); WASH. REV. CODE §
23A.08.425 (1989); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.725 (West Supp. 1989).
116. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-1221 to -1223 (Supp. 1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
8, § 203 (Supp. 1988); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-43-18 (West Supp. 1987); Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 271B.12-210 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1989); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.673 (West
Supp. 1990); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.459 (Vernon Supp. 1990); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 14A:10A-
1 to :10A-6 (West Supp. 1989); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 912 (McKinney 1986 & Supp.
1990); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 180.726 (West Supp. 1989).
117. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13A, § 910 (Supp. 1987); UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10-
76.5 (1987). "
118. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-1211 to -1217 (Supp. 1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
607.109 (West Supp. 1989); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42 (West Supp. 1989); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 12:135-:140.2 (West Supp. 1990); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 110D, §§ 1-8 (West
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Four of these types of laws function, either by design or de-
fault, to protect exclusively shareholders. The fair price, ap-
praisal, and control share laws attempt to resolve the problem of
coercion, either by regulating the second step of the two-tier
bids, or by separating the passage of control to the bidder from
the tendering of the shares. Disclosure statutes, such as New
York's Security Takeover Disclosure Act,119 specifically mandate
the disclosure of a proposed takeover's impact on nonsharehold-
ers. Each of these kinds of statutes, however, is still an inade-
quate safeguard for nonshareholder interests, because each puts
the information into the hands of those with the most incentive
to disregard it."20
Despite the emphasis on protecting shareholders, it is this as-
pect of state takeover legislation that is the most vulnerable. 21
The available empirical evidence strongly supports the view that
the successful completion of a hostile takeover is a wealth maxi-
mizing event for target shareholders. 22 Furthermore, it is ques-
tionable whether the "coercive effect" of tender offers on target
shareholders remains anything more than an academic bogey-
man, in light of the current predominance of cash any-and-all-
shares tender offers, "self-help" remedies such as fair price char-
ter amendments and poison pills, and the bid-up effect of an
auction for control.
1 23
The case for statutory intervention can more plausibly be
made on behalf of nonshareholders than shareholders. 124 In ad-
dition to socioeconomic disruption, nonshareholders face in-
Supp. 1990); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.671 (West Supp. 1990); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.407
(Vernon Supp. 1990); NEv. REV. STAT. § 78.3791 (Supp. 1987); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-90 to
-98 (Supp. 1989); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.831 (Baldwin 1988); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
18, §§ 1145-1155 (West Supp. 1990); 1987 OR. REV. STAT. § 60.807 (1989); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 180.25(9) (West Supp. 1989).
119. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 1600-13 (McKinney 1985); see generally Note, A Policy
Analysis of New York State's Security Takeover Disclosure Act, 53 BROOKLYN L. REV.
1117 (1988) (authored by Gregory G. Faragasso).
120. Booth, supra note 10, at 1673; see also supra note 95.
121. Coffee, supra note 63, at 438. Johnson and Millon go a step further, arguing that
shareholder welfare is a meaningless standard against which to assess state takeover
laws, in that the laws represent a deliberate rejection on the part of state legislators of
the shareholder primacy model. Johnson & Millon, supra note 28, at 847-48.
122. See supra Part III.
123. Coffee, supra note 63, at 439.
124. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 63, at 439-40; Davis, supra note 3, at 493. In fact, it
has been suggested that concern for nonshareholders was the tacit premise for the CTS
decision among many in the CTS majority. Id. at 517. This implication draws support
from the fact that Powell, the writer of the CTS opinion, was clearly concerned with the
plight of nonshareholders in his MITE concurrence. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S.
624, 646-47 (1982) (Powell, J., concurring in part).
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creased levels of uncompensated risk, as implicit contracts are
breached by shareholders eager to secure handsome premiums.
This increased risk creates a broad-based political constituency,
consisting of managers, employees, and local communities, that
is legitimately in need of legal protection because of the failure
of corporate governance mechanisms to adequately protect these
groups in the takeover context.
In addition to identifying the risks that the nonshareholder
group faces, the implicit contract analysis also suggests how a
state can respond effectively to this powerful and legitimate
voice. From this perspective, one of the board's roles is to medi-
ate among the legitimate expectations of the many corporate
constituents. 2 5 This is not to suggest that the board is simply
balancing different but equivalent interests. Rather, recognizing
that the law places a priority on shareholders' claims, the board
would be free in a takeover context to safeguard nonsharehold-
ers from the negative effects of efforts to increase shareholder
wealth. '2
Because the structure of a takeover circumvents the target
board, state takeover statutes that function to restore to the
board a voice in takeover negotiations can play an essential role
in filling this gap in nonshareholder protection. Of the five cur-
rent types of takeover laws, the law best suited to this end is the
business combination statute. 12 7 By forcing a bidder to negotiate
with the board or face serious restrictions following a takeover,
125. See Coffee, supra note 63, at 449-50.
126. Id. at 440, 450-58.
127. New York's Business Combination Statute has served as the model for later sec-
ond-generation statutes of this type. Johnson & Millon, supra note 28, at 850. For a list
of other states' business combination statutes, see supra note 116. The essential sections
of New York's law, N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 912 (McKinney 1986), read:
§ 912(a)(10)
(10) "Interested shareholder", when used in reference to any resident domestic
corporation, means any person (other than such resident domestic corporation or
any subsidiary of such resident domestic corporation) that
(A)(i) is the beneficial owner, directly or indirectly, of twenty percent or more
of the outstanding voting stock of such resident domestic corporation; or
(ii) is an affiliate or associate of such resident domestic corporation and at any
time within the five year period immediately prior to the date in question was
the beneficial owner, directly or indirectly, of twenty percent or more of the then
outstanding voting stock of such resident domestic corporation . ...
§ 912(a)(13)
(13) "Resident domestic corporation" means an issuer of voting stock which:
(A) is organized under the laws of this state; and
(B) either (i) has its principal executive offices and significant business opera-
tions located in this state; or (ii) has . . . at least two hundered fifty employees
or twenty-five percent of the total number of all employees . . . employed pri-
marily within the state; and
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the business combination statute functions like a poison pill, re-
storing to the board an active role in the takeover process. As
with the poison pill, the statutory penalties for failing to secure
board approval will serve primarily as leverage to bring the bid-
der to the board and are not likely to be triggered.128
In contrast to the poison pill, the business combination stat-
ute can be defended not as a shareholders' rights plan, but as a
(C) has at least ten percent of its voting stock owned beneficially by residents
of this state.
§ 912(b)
(b) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this chapter . . .
no resident domestic corporation shall engage in any business combination with
any interested shareholder of such resident domestic corporation for a period of
five years following such interested shareholder's stock acquisition date unless
such business combination or the purchase of stock made by such interested
shareholder on such interested shareholder's stock acquisition date is approved
by the board of directors of such resident domestic corporation prior to such
interested shareholder's stock acquisition date.
Wisconsin's business combination statute, recently upheld by the Seventh Circuit in
Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 877 F.2d 496 (7th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 110 S. Ct. 367 (1989), is essentially identical to New York's law except that
§ 80.726(1)(j) lowers the threshold ownership for interested stockholders to 10%, and
§ 180.726(2) reduces the moratorium on unapproved combinations to three years. Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 180.726 (West Supp. 1989).
Delaware's law, DEL. CODE. ANN., tit. 8, § 203 (Supp. 1988), which potentially is more
significant due to Delaware's unique role in American corporate law, differs from New
York's law in several important respects. Section 203(c)(5) lowers the threshold stock
ownership for interested stockholders to 15%, and § 203(a) reduces the moratorium on
unapproved combinations to three years. Section 203(a)(2) renders the statute inopera-
tive where the bidder has'succeeded in acquiring at least 85% of the target's outstanding
shares, and § 203(b)(3) permits companies to opt out of the protection of the statute by
amendment to the certificate of incorporation or bylaws.
Most importantly, Delaware's law contains no jurisdictional requirements analagous to
§ 912(a)(13) of the New York law. The significance of this omission will turn on the
degree of emphasis courts place on such nexus requirements, essential to the Indiana
statute upheld in CTS, because few publicly held Delaware corporations could meet
these requirements. Davis, supra note 3, at 521-22. In BNS, Inc. v. Koppers Co., 683 F.
Supp. 458, 472-73 (D. Del. 1988), a judge rejected the need for any additional nexus
requirements, while the court in RP Acquisition Corp. v. Staley Continental, Inc., 686 F.
Supp. 476 (D. Del. 1988), held that Delaware's substantial local interest in "preventing
the corporate form from becoming a shield for unfair business dealing" rendered unnec-
essary any additional nexus requirements. See also Davis, supra note 3, at 522 n.119.
128. As a practical matter, tender offers for companies with a poison pill are condi-
tioned on the board redeeming the pill as a result of negotiation or judicial determina-
tion. Bloomenthal, Introduction to J. BRYAN, CORPORATE ANTI-TAKEOVER DEFENSES: THE
POISON PILL DEVICE at Intro.-3 (1989). Such negotiations increase the target share-
holder's premium in a completed takeover. See Lee, Poison Pills Benefit Shareholders
by Forcing Raiders to Pay More for Targets, Study Says, Wall St. J., Mar. 31, 1988, at
55, col. 3 (finding a 69% increase in premiums after adjusting for market conditions).
Without board approval of a tender offer and the redemption of the poison pill, the cost
can be so high as to make the acquisition virtually impossible. See, e.g., Grand Metro.,
PLC v. Pillsbury Co., 558 A.2d 1049, 1051 n.2 (Del. Ch. 1988).
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stakeholders' rights plan. 129 Its usefulness would not be in rais-
ing the shareholder's premium (although it might also have that
effect), but in ensuring that nonshareholder concerns could re-
ceive appropriate attention. In order to accomplish this, the op-
portunity offered through the statute must be strongly tied to
the board's responsibility to nonshareholders. One means of en-
suring this would be to amend the corporation code to reflect the
legislature's concern that boards include nonshareholder inter-
ests in these negotiations.13
Once reestablished in the negotiating process, the board would
be free to consider nonshareholder interests. Even in the wake of
a successful offer, these interests could be safeguarded. For ex-
ample, the premium can be distributed among nonshareholder
groups, in the form of parachutes for middle management and
job retraining for laid-off workers, or as an agreement to retain
local headquarters and limit plant closings. 3' As a last resort, if
the offer were to proceed after the target board and the bidder
failed to come to terms, statutory restrictions on business trans-
actions following the successful bid could help to stabilize em-
ployment and the local community by preventing liquidations or
spin-offs.
Viewed as a form of stakeholder protection, business combina-
tion statutes can restore to corporate governance an effective
means of protecting the interests of nonshareholder constitu-
ents. So long as the board's responsibility to nonshareholders is
taken seriously, such laws express a legitimate state effort to
protect the nonshareholding constituents of its domestic corpo-
rations. 132 Such an effort is quite distinguishable from attempts
to hold local industry captive or to protect influential corpora-
tions. 1 33 Finally, although the Supreme Court has not yet re-
129. Johnson and Millon argue that a business combination statute cannot be inter-
preted as a shareholder protection act because its structure belies the rationale offered
for shareholder protection in a takeover context and it is likely to have an across-the-
board chilling effect on hostile bids, some of which may have been acceptable to target
shareholders. Johnson & Millon, supra note 28, at 850-51.
130. For an example of movement in this direction, see supra note 74 and accompa-
nying text.
131. Schumann, supra note 85, at 200.
132. Even so distinguished an opponent to takeover regulation as Judge Easterbrook
recognizes the legitimacy of this role: "Skepticism about the wisdom of a state's law does
not lead to the conclusion that the law is beyond the state's power, however. . . . Unless
a federal statute or the Constitution bars the way, Wisconsin's choice must be
respected." Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 877 F.2d 496, 502 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 367 (1989) (upholding the Wisconsin statute).
133. Coffee, supra note 10, at 99. Schumann cites several recent examples of take-
overs succeeding in the face of business combination statutes: Amber Aquisition Corp.
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viewed a business combination statute, preliminary analysis sug-
gests such a statute will survive constitutional challenge."'
and Heileman Brewing Co.; Bilzerian Partners Ltd. and Singer Corp.; Salant Acquisition
Corp. and Manhattan Industries Inc. See Schumann, supra note 85, at 200 n.10.
134. Whether or not these statutes are ultimately compatible with the Supreme
Court's ruling in CTS on the constitutionality of control share acquisition statutes is an
open issue beyond the scope of this Note. Nevertheless, the basic outline of the constitu-
tional challenges to business combination statutes, and the Seventh Circuit's response
regarding Wisconsin's statute in Amanda Acquisition do merit some discussion here.
One can object, on preemption grounds, that the board's de facto veto power over
tender offers alters the Williams Act's neutrality in favor of incumbent management.
Note, supra note 8, at 169-70. One can also argue that, in making tender offers unattrac-
tive to many potential bidders, such a statute is preempted by the Williams Act, if the
Act is read as creating a right for investors to receive the benefit of tender offers. Note,
The Constitutionality of Second Generation Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L. REV. 203, 231-
36 (1987) (authored by James R. Pagano). Using a commerce clause analysis, Bamonte
argues that the chilling effect of the post-acquisition moratorium constitutes a substan-
tial burden on interstate commerce by injuring investors, the bulk of whom live outside
of the state. Bamonte, The Dynamics of State Protectionism: A Short Critique of the
CTS Decision, 8 N. ILL. U.L. REV. 259, 266-68 (1988).
Amanda Acquisition responds to several of these concerns in a manner quite favorable
to advocates of state takeover legislation. Judge Easterbrook's basic conclusion is that
because the Wisconsin statute does not alter the process of tender offers, it does not
conflict with the Williams Act by possibly making Wisconsin a less attractive place in
which to launch takeover bids. Amanda Acquisition, 877 F.2d at 505. The Williams Act
does not create a right for investors to receive tender offers, nor does it confer a right
upon bidders to profit by them. Id. at 504.
For the view that a proper understanding of the Williams Act offers no credible sup-
port to the preemption challenge to business combination statutes, see Johnson & Mil-
Ion, Misreading the Williams Act, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1862, 1868 (1989); see also Boyer,
When It Comes to Hostile Tender Offers, Just Say No: Commerce Clause and Corpora-
tion Law in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 539, 594 (1988)
(stating that business combination statutes "may be unassailable under the specific hold-
ing of CTS," despite the increase in a target management's power, because the Court in
CTS approved director approval of a hostile bid, as opposed to a subsequent shareholder
vote, "as an alternative safeguard against coercive bids").
With regard to the commerce clause, Amanda Acquisition follows the approach, sug-
gested in Justice Scalia's CTS concurrence, CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp of Am., 481
U.S. 69, 94-97 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring), of de-emphasizing an "unfocused" balanc-
ing test in favor of examining whether the statute discriminates on the basis of state
boundaries. See Amanda Acquistion, 877 F.2d at 506-07. The Wisconsin statute, Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 180.726 (West Supp. 1989), like the Indiana statute in CTS, is indifferent to
the domicile of the bidder, and therefore not susceptible to attack on commerce clause
grounds. See Grippo, supra note 3, at 289-90. For a brief discussion of constitutional
issues unique to Delaware's statute, see supra note 127.
For a general overview of the constitutional issues involved in state takeover regula-
tion, see Kozyris, Corporate Takeovers at the Jurisdictional Crossroads: Preserving
State Authority Over Internal Affairs While Protecting the Transferability of Inter-
state Stock Through Federal Law, 36 UCLA L. REV. 1109 (1989); Pinto, The Constitu-
tion and the Market for Corporate Control: State Takeover Statutes after CTS Corp.,
29 WM. & MARY L. REv. 699 (1988); Comment, State Takeover Legislation: The Extent
of the States' Rights in the Creation of Control Share Acquisition Statutes, 42 Sw. L.J.
865 (1988) (authored by Mark S. Howard).
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Whether business combination statutes, or state takeover reg-
ulation in general, actually protect nonshareholder interests is
an empirical question that has received little attention. In the
case of New York, the legislature explicitly premised its business
combination statute on findings that out-of-state takeovers had
often resulted in the liquidation or relocation of New York as-
sets, which meant lost jobs, lost taxes, and depressed local
economies.1 S5
There is some concern, however, that strong protectionist
forces can lead to laws that entrench the management of large,
politically influential local corporations." 6 Business combination
statutes, in restoring to the board a role in the negotiations, are
uniquely vulnerable to that objection. Any attempt to
strengthen the boards' capacity to function as a voice for non-
shareholders inevitably runs the risk of increasing the potential
for management entrenchment.
According to one commentator, three features of the market
for control have strong political ramifications at the state level,
creating "nearly irresistible" pressure for pro-management, anti-
takeover legislation. 137 First, the immediate, wrenching socioeco-
nomic costs of takeover activity are borne by a localized few,
while the benefits are long-term and spread over the national
economy. 38 Second, local business interests often wield substan-
tial political power. 139 Third, the market in corporate charters
exerts a heavy influence on states eager for incorporation fees to
pass laws favorable to incumbent management. 4" An additional
concern is that, although there is no evidence that friendly
changes of control result in substantially less economic disloca-
tion, state takeover statutes uniformly focus on hostile changes
of control. 4
In response, it is necessary to point out that simply because
costs are borne by a localized few does not diminish the legiti-
macy of a state's concern for "its few." This is particularly true
when some of the benefits that flow to the national economy
may be wealth transfers from these local nonshareholder
constituencies.
135. See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1612, Historical Note; Johnson & Millon, supra note
28, at 850; Note, supra note 119, at 1119.
136. Booth, supra note 10, at 1635.
137. Bamonte, supra note 134, at 261-63.
138. Id. at 262.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 263.
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Furthermore, three factors mitigate concern for local busi-
nesses' political clout and the effects of the race to the bottom in
state corporation codes. First, in extreme cases where the pro-
tectionist motive is quite strong, it is likely that the statute
would not pass constitutional muster under the commerce
clause. 42 Second, a board's actions under any form of state take-
over statute would still be subject to judicial review. The courts
are no strangers to the scrutiny of a board's defensive action for
entrenchment motives, and statutes which permit non-
shareholder interests to be considered only provide one more
motive into which the courts will probe.14 Third, the rapid pace
of change in the nature of takeover defenses and the variations
in state law that are in part a reaction to this frenzied change
are persuasive reasons why regulation of this area should remain
with the states. States have long-standing experience with cor-
porate governance and the law of fiduciary duty; they are ideally
poised to provide a good balance of continuity, stability and ad-
aptation to change within their jurisdiction."'
Finally, the focus in state takeover statutes on hostile changes
of control further demonstrates the legitimacy and need for the
state's intervention. In friendly changes of control, the board of
directors will play a significant role. There is no danger that the
forum for nonshareholder concerns will be sidestepped by the
very structure of the transaction, as is the case in a hostile
tender offer directly to the shareholders.
Professor Romano, in one of the few systematic attempts to
research the political history of a state takeover statute, found
that in the case of Connecticut's fair price provision, there did
not appear to be evidence supporting a coalition theory for the
passage of the law. ' 5 On the contrary, the main impetus for the
legislation was the Aetna Life and Casualty Insurance Company,
one of the state's largest corporations."' It would be premature
to conclude on the basis of this finding that state takeover laws
are irredeemably protectionist. To begin with, Connecticut's ex-
perience is not representative, for the simple reason that it con-
142. Coffee, supra note 10, at 101.
143. Shipman, supra note 10, at 537. For the view that the business judgment rule is
by its nature too protective of incumbent management, see Farrar, supra note 80, at 39-
40; Davis, supra note 3, at 511-12.
144. Shipman, supra note 10, at 537-38.
145. Romano, supra note 12, at 122-23, 136; see also Romano, The Future of Hostile
Takeovers: Legislation and Public Opinion, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 457 (1988); Macey, supra
note 8, at 470; Note, supra note 8, at 170-71.
146. Romano, supra note 12, at 123.
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cerns a fair price statute. 1 7 Because a fair price provision is not
designed to protect nonshareholder interests in the event of a
takeover, a lack of interest on the part of nonshareholder groups
cannot indict the thesis that state takeover laws, particularly
business combination statutes, are responsive to nonshareholder
interests. Furthermore, as Romano herself points out, it is possi-
ble that the legislators who passed the bill had nonshareholder
effects in mind.14
V. CONCLUSION
When Berle and Means first publicized the separation of own-
ership and control in modern publicly held corporations, they
could hardly have foreseen either the dramatic increase in take-
overs, which is a consequence of this separation, or the effect
this would have on the fabric of corporate governance. Neverthe-
less, in maintaining that the proprietary nature of stock owner-
ship was seriously undermined by this separation, they pre-
dicted the advent of the modern shareholder who facilitates the
takeover market as a largely passive investor.
In identifying the normative gulf created by this revolution in
ownership, Berle and Means set for corporate law the task of
formulating a suitable norm for exercising and monitoring con-
trol. The ambiguity surrounding the fiduciary duty of a target
board is illustrative of the complexity of this task. As evidenced
by state statutes and case law, the interests of nonshareholders
are within the scope of this duty. This strongly suggests that,
whatever the precise formulation of the corporate norm, it is
most certainly not exclusively shareholder wealth maximization,
as takeover advocates would present it.
In attempting to resolve conflicts between management and
shareholders, the market for control has highlighted a second set
of conflicts between shareholders and other stakeholders, who in
many cases stand to lose as much as, or more than, the share-
holders stand to gain. This fact reflects the shortsightedness of
147. For example, Wisconsin's experience with its control share acquisition statute
supports the coalition theory. The statute, sponsored by the state administrative agency
entrusted with protecting shareholders, enjoyed, widespread and broad-based support,
both in the Democratic legislature and throughout the state. Davis, supra note 3, at 492-
99. Generally, "many at the state level sincerely see these statutes as necessary to protect
the long-accepted allocation of claims against the corporation-not only those of man-
agement and shareholders, but those of employees and communities as well-from the
disruptive effects of what is perceived as market caprice." Id. at 499.
148. Romano, supra note 12, at 135.
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arguments for a deregulated market for control that focus exclu-
sively on shareholder wealth maximization. These calls for de-
regulation mischaracterize the corporate norm and ignore the le-
gitimate need of nonshareholders for protection from
shareholder overreaching.
State takeover statutes have the strongest claim to legitimacy
when they are structured in response to this need for protection.
The business combination statute, by restoring the board to an
active role in takeover negotiation, can best meet this need. Bid-
ding corporations would have to reach an accommodation with
the board, which, according to corporate law and policy, would
require that provision be made for nonshareholders. Corpora-
tions failing to reach such an accommodation would face severe
restrictions on their manipulation of the target's assets. Business
combination statutes, reflecting the state's concern for both the
interests of its nonshareholding constituencies and the board's
responsibility to protect these interests, are the most effective
and defensible way for states to protect nonshareholder interests
in takeover contests.
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